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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
A difficult year: Moscow moves to manage crises, cadres, and uncertainty 
On January 28, Russian Prime Minister Putin gave an introductory address to the 
World Economic Forum in Davos that was dubbed "liberal" (1) within Russia and 
"absurd" without. (2)  The content of the address, as well as the tone of Putin's 
later press conference was contradictory; at times Putin sounded conciliatory, at 
times the blustering braggart re-emerged.  What did seem clear is that the 
speech reflected changing times, and while Putin may have an inclination to 
accuse and blame developments on a "unipolar" world system, that rhetoric is no 
longer useful.  One vignette from the address echoes Marc Antony's "I come to 
bury Caesar, not to praise him":  "In the last few months, virtually every speech 
on this subject started with criticism of the United States. This time, however, I 
will do nothing of the kind. I just want to remind you that, just a year ago, 
American delegates speaking from this rostrum emphasised the U.S. economy's 
fundamental stability and its cloudless prospects. Today, investment banks, the 
pride of Wall Street, have virtually ceased to exist. In just 12 months, they have 
posted losses exceeding the profits they made in the last 25 years-an 
unprecedented scope! This example alone reflects the real situation better than 
any criticism." (3) 
 
After his prepared remarks, Putin fielded questions from the audience and, later, 
from the International Media Council and International Business Council, and it 
was during these exchanges that Putin returned to form.  When asked about 
perceptions of Russia in the world, Putin quickly turned the question around: "But 
why don't you think about your country's image in Russia? Why is Russia asked 
about it all the time? Do you think everything is all right in other countries, 
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including Western Europe and the United States? There are plenty of problems 
there, and you shouldn't turn up your noses and think that everything is swell." 
(4) 
 
In his response to another question on what levels of state intervention in the 
Russian economy were acceptable, Putin explained his understanding of the 
need to protect key sectors through state controls, but also sent an interesting 
message for domestic consumption, to Russia's oligarchs – after first glancing 
about the room to see if any were present: "I do not see representatives of our 
business community here. Even if they were here, I would say what I now want to 
say. And I am sure of what I am now saying. I get the impression that many of 
them want to stand as close to the state as possible, to try and hide behind its 
broad back to solve their problems." (5) 
 
Certainly, as the international economic crisis continues to shake the Russian 
economy and Russian-owned businesses, Russia's oligarchs have stood as 
close to the state as possible, especially when it was likely to garner them bail 
out funds.  There are even indications that the oligarchs, even those famously at 
odds, are uniting at the request of the state, in the person of Deputy Prime 
Minister Igor Sechin, to form a mega metals and mining concern, what one 
analyst termed an "iron and steel "collective farm"" meant to help stave off 
international competition.  (6) The deal to create the company, which would be 
managed by Putin's close associate, Sergei Chemezov, under his Russian 
Technologies umbrella, has been sent to Sechin for approval, although it seems 
unlikely that the idea did not either germinate with Sechin or at least win his 
preliminary approval before becoming public.  Among those involved in the plan 
are Vladimir Potanin and Oleg Deripaska (Norilsk Nickel), Igor Zyuzin (Mechel), 
Roman Abramovich and Alexander Abramov (Evraz Group), and Dmitri 
Rybolovlev (Uralkali). (7)  The deal would give the state, via Russian 
Technologies, a "25% plus one share in the unified holding company," and given 
the amount of debt via state loans several of the individuals involved have 
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accumulated, the deal is a form of "debt for shares" that stands the 1990s "loans 
for share" scheme on its head. (8) 
 
Even as Putin made his pitch to the international business community at Davos, 
efforts to stabilize the ruble appeared to be faltering.  A new scheme to link the 
ruble to a combined Euro and Dollar "basket," against which the Bank Rossii 
suggested the currency could potentially fall to 41, seemed unable to staunch the 
slide.  Thus far, the ruble has lost more than 7% since the announcement of this 
arrangement.  According to Gaelle Blanchard of Societe Generale SA in London, 
"Right now the market is convinced it wants to see the ruble lower.  As long as 
the central bank gives these targets, then speculators are going to have 
something to aim for." (9) 
 
The heart of the Russian economy remains energy resources and the price of oil 
and gas.  However, even with oil over $100 per barrel, Russia's actions, notably 
the August invasion of Georgia, gave many potential partners enough pause to 
cause a decline in Russia's financial markets.  Now, the effect of the international 
economic crisis on energy prices is likely to force significant changes to Russia's 
policy courses, both domestic and foreign.  While some analysts point to an 
inverse relationship between the price of oil and the saturation of "freedom" 
within oil-producing states (along with more cooperative trends in foreign policy), 
the possibility certainly remains that Russia will react to economic challenges by 
turning inward and exacerbating xenophobic and extreme nationalist trends.  (10) 
 
Perhaps the greatest challenge confronting Russia's ruling "tandem" (if, indeed 
Putin and Medvedev are still working at all in unison) results from the 
combination of economic and political uncertainty.  Political instability arises from 
the lack of transparency in the political decision-making process.  Until tensions 
within the diarchy (where open criticism has begun to emerge) are resolved, the 
functioning of the Russian state may be paralyzed—both at regional and central 
levels—by functionaries unsure of exactly who is in charge and who speaks for 
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the leadership. The diarchy, created through Putin's attempt to avoid a 
succession struggle, has created an illogic of governance that may have 
attempted to mask the true seat of authority within Russia, but has resulted in a 
very dangerous situation made more disadvantageous by difficult times. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "Putin's speech in Davos shows 'liberal approach'," Interfax, 29 Jan 09 via 
David Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 2009-#21, 30 Jan 09. 
(2) "Investors say Nyet to Putin's Ruble after "Absurd" Davos Speech," by Alex 
Nicholson, Bloomberg, 30 Jan 09 via David Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 2009-
#21, 30 Jan 09. 
(3) Text of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's speech at the opening ceremony of the 
World Economic Forum, 28 Jan 09, http://premier.gov.ru via JRL, 2009-#20, 29 
Jan 09. 
(4) "Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the International 
Business Council at the Davos World Economic Forum and answered their 
questions," 29 Jan 09, http://premier.gov.ru via JRL, 2009-#21, 30 Jan 09. 
(5) "Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met with members of the International Media 
Council on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos," 29 Jan 09, 
http://premier.gov.ru via JRL, 2009-#21, 30 Jan 09. 
(6) "Kremlin Meets Oligarchs," Argumenty nedeli, No 3, January 2009; What the 
Papers Say (WPS) Weekly Review, 29 Jan 09 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) "Possible merger for Norilsk Nickel, Metalloinvest, Evraz Group, Mechel, and 
Uralkali," Vedomosti, 19 Jan 09; The Russian Business Monitor via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(8) Ibid.  
(9) Quote from Gaelle Blanchard and details from "Investors say Nyet…," 
Bloomberg, Ibid. 
(10) For a discussion on the relationship between the price of oil and the level of 
freedom within oil-producing states, please see “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” 
By Michael L. Ross, World Politics 53.3 (2001) 325-361;"Blood Barrels: Why Oil 
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Wealth Fuels Conflict," by Michael L. Ross, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008; and 
"The First Law of Petropolitics," by Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Policy, 
May/June 2006. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
The debate over arming reporters: Are we asking the right questions? 
Russia’s small but persistent opposition movement was dealt a double blow last 
Monday, January 19, when prominent human rights attorney Stanislav Markelov 
was murdered on his way out of a press conference. When Anastasia Baburova, 
an opposition journalist who worked for Novaya gazeta, attempted to help 
Markelov, she was also killed. (1) Markelov called the press conference to 
protest the early release of Yuri Budanov, who had been serving ten years in 
prison for the murder of a Chechen woman, committed when he was serving as a 
Colonel in the Russian Army during the war in Chechnya. 
 
The audacity of this crime, which was not only carried out in broad daylight, but 
on Moscow’s Prechistenka Street, a fashionable and busy area located less than 
a kilometer from the Kremlin, sadly has become commonplace.  Since Vladimir 
Putin assumed the presidency of Russia in 2000, there have been numerous 
attempts to sabotage, silence, or eradicate those who oppose government policy. 
For example, as noted in a previous issue (see ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, 
Number 6), the 2006 murder of Novaya gazeta reporter Anna Politkovskaya, 
(who was one of Markelov’s clients,) remains unsolved, as does the November 
beating of Mikhail Beketov, an opposition journalist in the Moscow suburb of 
Khimki. (2) Beketov’s self-produced paper, Khimkinskaya pravda, was well 
known in the region for its free criticism of the Khimki government and its 
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relationship to the Kremlin. Beketov has spent the past two months in the 
hospital after having endured multiple amputations and a short coma.  He 
recently was moved back into intensive care, after his health took a turn for the 
worse. (3) The most recent victim, Baburova, also was an opposition figure, a 
journalist who marched against fascism and protested the government’s human 
rights record. (4)  
 
It is not just journalists and lawyers, but dissidents and political opponents at 
home and abroad who have been subject to retribution for the crime of opposing 
the status quo in Russia.  There is no official connection between the Kremlin 
and the growing list of murders, “accidents,” and tragedies that have happened to 
befall those who speak publicly against injustice in Russia.  However, the 
government not only has failed to demand accountability for these crimes, it has 
worked actively against those who have.  For example, the trial of the four men 
who ostensibly plotted and carried out Politkovskaya’s murder has been marred 
since the beginning by the authorities’ failure to apprehend the triggerman, 
numerous delays in the trial proceedings, and protests by both sides. (5) Despite 
numerous condemnations, including those of the French government and the 
President of the European Union, the Kremlin has released only one statement 
on the matter, when the foreign ministry accused critics of “artificially 
politiciz[ing]” the matter to discredit Russia. (6) 
 
Putting aside the fact that it would be difficult to “artificially politicize” the already 
highly charged issue of free speech, the fact remains that opposition figures are 
at risk in Russia, and the question of what to do about it is fast becoming a 
serious issue among those who control the media. 
 
In a press conference held last Thursday, Aleksandr Lebedev, president of 
Novyye Media holding firm, stated his belief that Baburova’s murder was the 
result of her work at his newspaper, Novaya gazeta. Speaking from the central 
office of Russian news agency Interfax, Lebedev hinted at “quite a few things 
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which we shall not disclose for the time being” (7) that connected his journalists’ 
work with their murders.  These connections, he warned, are the result of an 18-
month ongoing investigation that has yet to be published. (8) This statement may 
be somewhat of a reach, as most reports indicate that Baburova was simply in 
the wrong place at the wrong time, but all the same, she was covering Markelov’s 
press conference, an event that was likely to draw the ire of Kremlin supporters. 
 
Regardless, the purpose of Lebedev’s press conference was to stress the point 
that journalists are increasingly unsafe in Russia, and to introduce a new aspect 
to the debate: self-defense.  Currently, several members of the Novaya gazeta 
staff have private security details. However, as it is not possible to put all 
journalists under constant guard, Lebedev announced his intension to ask the 
Federal Security Service to allow his journalists to carry weapons, in order to 
protect themselves. (9) The staff of Novaya gazeta is spearheading the effort to 
protect journalists by arming them.  When asked why he thinks this plan would 
improve the current plight of Russia’s journalists, Novaya gazeta’s editor in chief 
Dmitri Muratov recently explained that “when threats are regularly resounding, 
when at present one of our leading employees is forced to work under guard, 
when out of five murders, not one has in fact been solved,” (10) journalists want 
to protect themselves in some way.  
 
To carry out his plan, Lebedev will have to fight an uphill battle against the 
Russian bureaucracy. According to current gun control laws in Russia, citizens 
do have the right to own certain weapons for self-defense, including gas pistols 
and revolvers.  In reality, however, it is nearly impossible to acquire the special 
license necessary to be able to purchase these weapons.  If the government 
deems one worthy of owning a gun, the future owner must pass a test that 
covers proper handling and firing before being allowed to purchase a firearm.  
Finally, once a citizen becomes a gun owner, he or she is then subject to many 
other laws that govern their use and storage, the most stringent of which is the 
caveat that every bullet fired must be reported to the nearest police department.  
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The special license lasts for a period of five years, at which point the licensing 
process begins again. (11) 
 
The idea of arming journalists is troubling for several reasons, not least of which 
is that it seems to be the legal equivalent of applying a bandage to the torso of 
someone suffering from a stomach ulcer.  Ultimately, the question is not whether 
or not journalists should be allowed to carry weapons for self-defense, it is why 
they need to be so concerned for their safety in the first place.  The heart of the 
problem is that independent journalists, and others who challenge the state, are 
being murdered, and their assassins have no fear of retribution from a hamstrung 
judicial system.  In a country where more than 21 reporters have been murdered 
under suspicious circumstances since 2000, (12) handguns for self-defense are 
only a symptom of the larger problem. 
 
Moscow Police Chief Vladimir Pronin has condemned Lebedev’s remarks, 
arguing that “the more weapons there are, the more disorder there is.” (13) He 
also noted that “in the event of journalists being threatened with danger, [the 
Moscow Police] have a scheme under which their safety can be assured,” (14) 
which might be a stronger line of reasoning if events hadn’t proven him wrong so 
many times already. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Peter Fedynsky, “List of Unsolved Russian Murders Growing,” Voice of 
America News, 21 Jan 09 via http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-01-21-
voa22.cfm.  Last accessed 23 Jan 09. 
(2) Rose Monacelli, “Journalism: Still Russia’s most dangerous profession,” The 
ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 6, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 
Ideology, and Policy, 11 Dec 08 via 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/news.shtml#domestic.  Last accessed 23 Jan 09. 
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(3)  “Assaulted Russian Journalist’s Health Turns for the Worse,” The Other 
Russia, 10 Jan 09 via http://www.theotherrussia.org/2009/01/10/assaulted-
russian-journalists-health-turns-for-the-worse/.  Last accessed 23 Jan 09. 
(4)  Yelena Milashina, “We Are Not Afraid,” Novaya gazeta, 21 Jan 09 translated 
by Free Speech Blog, Index on Censorship via 
http://blog.indexoncensorship.org/2009/01/21/we-are-not-afraid/.  Last accessed 
23 Jan 09. 
(5) “Journalism: Still Russia” most dangerous profession” Ibid. 
(6) “Slain Russian Lawyer Buried,” AFP via News24.com, 
http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_2457842,00.html.  
Last accessed 23 Jan 09.   
(7) “Russian tycoon links recent high-profile murders to liberal paper he owns,” 
Interfax, 22 Jan 09 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 23 Jan 09, 2009-#15. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Ibid.  
(10) “Editor slams ministry’s view that journalist murder ‘not political,’” BBC 
Monitoring, Ekho Moskvy, 22 Jan 09 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 23 Jan 09, 
2009-#15. 
(11) Gayane Matseichik, “Legalization of free arms sales in Russia to result in 
massive upsurge of criminality,” Pravda.ru, 31 Oct 05 via Johnson’s Russia List 
(JRL), 31 Oct 05, #10-JRL9283. 
(12) “Russia - Annual Report 2008,” Reporters Without Borders, Jan 2008 via 
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=25500. 
(13) “Moscow police chief says journalists have no need for guns,” RIA Novosti, 
23 Jan 09 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 23 Jan 09, 2009-#15. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Dzhanibekov: GRU assassination? 
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On 13th February 2004, Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev was killed in Doha, Qatar when 
his car exploded. Yanderbiyev (a former Chechen President) was returning home 
from a mosque when the explosion occurred. Yanderbiyev's 13 year-old son and 
two bodyguards also perished in the blast. At the time of his death, Yanderbiyev 
was near the top of Russia's “most wanted” list, charged amongst other things, 
with membership in an "illegal armed formation." 
 
Within days of the incident, Qatari law-enforcement agencies had arrested two 
Russian individuals carrying Secret Service passports. In short order, it emerged 
that the detainees were GRU operatives, with reputations for carrying out 
successful "special operations" against separatist commanders in Chechnya. (1) 
Tried by the Qatari courts in the summer of 2004, the two officers were found 
guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Later the same year, the two 
were extradited to Russia on the understanding that they would serve the 
remainder of their sentences in domestic prisons. Russian authorities—not 
unexpectedly—reneged on this understanding, issuing a statement that any 
sentence imposed outside the country was "irrelevant," and admitting that the 
agents were not incarcerated. (2) The Yanderbiyev operation likely was viewed 
as a failure in Moscow due to the capture and trial of its agents.  Nonetheless, 
early last month it became clear that the Qatari debacle has not deterred GRU 
from carrying out further assassinations.      
 
On 9 December, Islam Dzhanibekov, another high-profile former Chechen rebel 
commander, was gunned down in Istanbul where he had been living for the last 
six years. At the time of writing, Turkish authorities have not announced the 
conclusions of their investigation. Instead, they simply have expounded two 
theories. First, that Dzhanibekov may have been killed as part of an internecine 
struggle between warring Chechen factions. More likely however, is the alternate 
theory that he was targeted by Russian Secret Services: Law enforcement 
officials in Istanbul have stated that the hit was carried out with a 7.62 mm pistol, 
 11 
most likely an MSP double-barreled weapon that allegedly is GRU's favored 
assassination weapon. (3) 
 
Two days after his murder, the Russian Defense Ministry's TV news station 
(Zvezda), issued a report on Dzhanibekov, claiming that he was responsible for 
the deaths of over 300 civilians, and insisting that he had been involved in 
fundraising on behalf of Chechen separatists since moving to Istanbul. (4) Since 
no statements have been forthcoming from senior Security Service officials, 
Zvezda's report could be taken as the official state reaction – and its tone was 
one of satisfaction, if not tacit admission. 
 
Given that more than a month has passed since the assassination, it is extremely 
unlikely that Turkish authorities will be able to apprehend the killers, whether they 
were fellow Chechens or Russian intelligence operatives. Even if they could be 
identified, the assassins probably would have left the country immediately after 
completing their assignment. If the murderers were secret agents, there is little 
chance of justice being served: Russia, as the Litvinenko case demonstrates, will 
not extradite its citizens under any circumstances. 
 
Katyn archives: Quid pro quo? 
In the last twelve months, the FSB gradually and selectively has released 
documents from its archives. The first batch of declassified files, opened in April 
2007, pertained to the great famine and purges of the Stalinist period, while the 
second concerned the mass deportations and forced resettlements in the Baltics 
between the end of the Second World War and Stalin's death in March 1953. In 
each of these instances, it seems clear that the FSB's actions were more of a 
public relations effort than an attempt to further historical research. (5) 
 
Six weeks ago, the FSB declassified and released yet another set of documents. 
This time, the files concerned the infamous Katyn massacre that occurred in 
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1940. Historians estimate that 22,000 Polish prisoners of war were liquidated by 
the Soviet NKVD, following the partitioning of Poland with Germany. (6) 
 
Speaking to Interfax, General Vasily Khristoforov (Head of the FSB's Registration 
and Archives Department) claimed that the documents made public constituted 
all that remained of the FSB's files on the matter. (7) Khristoforov claimed that 
most of the information on the atrocity had been destroyed on "orders from the 
top" of the KGB (8) during the late 1950's. 
 
It is highly unlikely that information on a matter as emotive and controversial as 
the Katyn massacre would be released on a whim—especially in light of the 
historically fraught relations between Warsaw and Moscow. It is therefore 
legitimate to ask what the motivation for declassifying the remaining files is. 
Moscow may hope that laying the massacre to rest results in more cooperative 
behavior from Poland, particularly in regards to the planned US ABM assets to 
be placed there. If this is the case, the Kremlin is grasping at straws. Any bases 
in Poland will be considered US soil, and Washington is unlikely to permit third 
party access without the strictest of controls. 
 
Politkovskaya trial update 
In mid-November three individuals charged with complicity in the murder of Anna 
Politkovskaya went on trial in Moscow. Within a matter of days, the proceedings 
had descended into farce. First, an early decision by the judge to open the trial to 
the public was abruptly reversed, allegedly due to security concerns on the part 
of the jury. When members of the jury bravely and publicly renounced the judge's 
ruling, a ten-day recess was announced, after which the case was re-opened to 
the public, with the caveat that the court would be closed while classified 
evidence was heard. (9) 
 
At the end of December, defense lawyers at the trial went on the offensive, 
claiming that there were serious discrepancies in the State's case. First, the DNA 
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samples and palm prints collected from the murder scene and the murder 
weapon, do not match those of the accused. (10) Secondly, footage from 
surveillance cameras at Politkovskaya's apartment building shows the alleged 
assassin entering the building after the time of death as presented by the 
prosecution. (11) Finally, the third defendant in the trial, Sergei Khadzhikurbanov, 
possesses an apparently iron-clad alibi, in the form of video footage of his 
presence at his mother's birthday party, which was held on the same day as the 
assassination. (12) After the defense had presented its evidence, the trial was 
once more adjourned. The proceedings resumed on 19 January, and continue 
with no verdict at the time of writing. 
 
Although the second discrepancy in the prosecution's case is tenuous (the time 
variation is only 60 seconds), the palm prints, DNA and Khadzhikurbanov alibi 
present authorities with major problems. While the alleged triggerman (Rustam 
Makhmudov) is still on the run, two of the defendants are his brothers, and as 
such, their DNA would share commonalities. If the DNA from the crime scene did 
not reveal even a tenuous match, and the alibi holds up, all three accused may 
have to be acquitted. This turn of events would place the authorities in an 
extremely embarrassing situation, whereby the only person still being held in 
connection with Politkovskaya's murder is a senior FSB officer, Lieutenant-
Colonel Pavel Ryaguzov. 
 
What action the authorities will take remains to be seen, but they are clearly in a 
catch-22 situation. If the (apparently) exonerating evidence is expunged or the 
jury is ordered to disregard it, the trial will be exposed as utter farce. On the other 
hand, if the defendants are acquitted, the responsible law-enforcement agencies 
will be labeled as incompetent. If both of these outcomes are too unpalatable, 
attempts may be made to spin the matter, and to argue that the trial shows that 
Russia's judicial system functions in a democratic, transparent manner. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) See The NIS Observed, An Analytical Review, Volume IX, Number 4 (5 
March 2004).  
(2) "Convicted Russia Agents 'Missing,'" BBC News, 17 Feb 05 via 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4275147.stm.  
(3) "Russian Trace Suspected In Murder of Former Chechen Field Commander 
in Istanbul," Ekho Moskvy Radio, 11 Dec 08; OSC Translated Text via World 
News Connection.  
(4) "Former Chechen Separatist Commander Assassinated in Istanbul," Axis 
Globe News, 11 Dec 08 via www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1713.  
(5) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIII, Number 2 (26 April 07) 
(6) "All Available Documents On Katyn Massacre Handed Over To Poland-FSB 
Official," Interfax, 18 Dec 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(7) Ibid.  
(8) "All Available Documents On Katyn Massacre Handed Over To Poland," 
Interfax-AVN Online, 18 Dec 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
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ITAR-TASS, 29 Dec 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News. 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Erik Rundquist 
 
Russian military reform – challenges ahead      
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Over the past several months, Russian military and civilian  leaders have 
expended time, energy, and money to kick-start the Russian armed forces down 
the path of reform with a special emphasis on troop reduction, task organization, 
and fighting doctrine. (1)  During December 2008 and January 2009 some 
reforms were illuminated with regard to training programs and finances, however 
new doubts have been cast over whether or not the plans for military reform will 
reach their ultimate goal. Changes brought about by the global economic crisis 
have bolstered “loyal opposition” positions against the sweeping reforms.  
Moreover, the methodology and rationale for the reform plans are still drawing ire 
from government officials, pundits, and citizens opposed to this reform plan. 
 
Training concerns 
A key element to the foundation of Defense Minister Anatoli Serdyukov’s reforms 
is based on appropriate military training and education.  Russian General of the 
Army and Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolai Pankov remarked that the current 
state of Russian military training is “excessively capital-intensive” with activities 
conducted at 65 different educational establishments consisting of 15 military 
academies, four universities, and 46 higher military schools and institutes. (2)  
The general further added that, “‘Departmental egotism’ has led to a situation 
where the duplication of officers’ training in related military specialties at military 
educational establishments under different subordination has become 
widespread.” (3)  Pankov also notes that up to 46 percent of the total military 
education budget is spent on the maintenance and repair of the grounds and 
facilities and that the use of the training facilities was no greater than 60-70 
percent of capacity. (4)  
 
An interesting contrast to Pankov’s concerns over excessive and redundant 
education was highlighted by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Army 
General Nikolai Makarov, who publicly complained about the lack of properly 
trained officers.  Makarov stated, “Over the past 18 years, there has grown a 
whole constellation of colonels and even generals who have never conducted a 
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single exercise during their service.” (5)  General Makarov voiced these concerns 
despite the hundreds of well-publicized and recently completed joint and 
combined force training events involving all branches of the Russian military. (6)  
Commander of the Far East Air Force and Air Defense Combined Formation, 
Lieutenant General Valeri Ivanov, commenting on positive results of the reforms, 
noted that in 2008 there were 200 separate exercises and that the “high intensity 
of combat training” (to include a 15 percent increase in flying hours) dramatically 
raised the professionalism of his force. (7) However, Ivanov also stated that 
despite advanced training reforms, he was forced to focus on the more 
elementary aspects of training when both junior and senior officers started to 
“forget the rules of the Russian language” in their reports, and further 
commenting that “Many commanders are not computer literate.” (8)  
 
Closing military facilities also has an impact on the locales in which they are 
situated, and members of these communities are struggling to be heard on the 
issue. Recently, residents of Irkutsk took to the streets upon discovering that the 
local training center for approximately 2,500 air force engineer cadets and faculty 
will be closed. (9)  Retired Colonel Viktor Shprakh along with other protestors 
complained that the proposed new university site does not have the appropriate 
laboratories, teaching staff, or research tools.  He further commented that the 
Defense Ministry’s hopes of the faculty members packing up and moving from 
the eastern Russian facility is “nonsense.” (10)  Potentially more challenging for 
Serdyukov’s reform is the battle for public opinion – a sign during the Irkutsk rally 
stated, “Redeployment of Irkutsk higher military aviation engineering school is 
redeployment of money into officials’ pockets.” (11)  
 
Financial matters  
Another critical element of Defense Minister Serdyukov’s reform is based on the 
proper allocation of funds and making sure that they reach the “right pockets.”  
He notes for the 2009 budget, “There are plans to increase considerably the 
funding allocated for the combat training of troops and the purchase of weapons 
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and military equipment.” (12)  However, Serdyukov does not have a blank check 
and the savings must come from somewhere.  While the afore-mentioned 
training facility consolidation is one avenue, the much touted elimination of 
manpower positions in the Russian military appears, on the surface, to be the 
quickest and simplest option.  The hope is that the Russian military will continue 
to slash approximately 200,000 officer and warrant officer positions by 2012, with 
the remaining permanent readiness unit personnel receiving pay comparable to 
that in “developed countries.” (13)  In addition, a bonus and cash award program 
for 34,000 officers and generals was started on 1 January 2009 with payments 
meted out for junior officers, mid and upper tier commanders depending on 
service, rank and position. (14) 
 
Targeting the nearly 205,000 officers positions (with 44,000 currently vacant) that 
will be cut from the Russian military, Deputy Defense Minister for Financial and 
Economic Work, Lyubov Kudelina introduced a “one-off” severance payment up 
to R185,000, based on time served on active duty. (15)  Kudelina also noted that 
nearly 60,000 junior officers, who are not entitled to pensions, would be 
transferred to the Defense Ministry’s reserve and paid a monthly allowance 
averaging R20,600, as long as they remain on reserve status. (16)  Overall, the 
cutback of officers is expected to cost nearly R80 billion in order to implement 
Serdyukov’s reforms, with nearly 117,500 troops to be discharged from service in 
2009. (17)  Clearly, Russia is absorbing an “up front” cost by reducing its ranks 
through these reforms.  
 
Viktor Ozerov, Chairman of the Federation Council Committee of Defense and 
Security, described a mid-December two-hour closed door meeting with the 
Russian military leadership as “constructive and frank.” (18)  One of the key 
issues involved the discharge of so large a number of officers as part of the 
Russian military reform.  During the meeting, General Makarov noted that the 
dismissed officers would not be “thrown out onto the street” and would be offered 
other posts, such as civilian positions, in order to receive social benefits and 
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housing. (19)  Likewise, the organizational reform involving the dismissal of 
nearly 200 general officers by mid-2009 promises to save some money, 
however, like the junior officers, sources indicate that these generals will 
continue working within the Defense Ministry as “civil experts.” (20)  If the fate of 
the dismissed junior and general officers is any indication, perhaps the financial 
reward of massive troop reductions will not be realized.  On an even more 
somber note, Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov told the Defense 
Minister and his top generals that he was concerned about the reforms, 
particularly about finding employment for the recently dismissed soldiers.  
Mironov cautioned, “There is now already a large army of people who do not 
know how to feed their families.  We cannot allow a multi-thousand group of 
people who professionally handle weapons to join them.” (21) 
 
Continued opposition 
While senior Russian military leaders have maintained a regimen of briefing on 
the progress of military reform, the impact of global economic difficulties may 
prove to be a drag on the course of transformation.  While most analysts agree 
that some sort of reform is needed within the Russian military, some are 
suggesting that both the pace and timing of the reforms are of considerable 
concern.  Army General Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military 
Sciences, warned, “It makes sense to adjust the schedule for discharging officers 
as part of the downsizing measures, so as not to cast them on the labor market 
in a period of economic crisis.” (22) Confusing the issue even more, Deputy 
Minister of Defense Pankov’s analysis of the global economic crisis actually calls 
for the pace of military reform to be completed as soon as possible, as opposed 
to slowing it down, as Gareyev suggests. (23)  
 
The secretive nature of consultations over funding the reforms, such as the 
afore-mentioned closed door Duma session, highlights another point of 
contention. Retired Major General Vladimir Dvorkin of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences noted, “There is no open discussion in the legislature or the executive 
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or in the independent expert community.  No one knows anything.” (24)  In order 
to counter these accusations, Serdyukov reinstated the  General Staff Institute of 
Plenipotentiaries with an eye towards overseeing and explaining the reforms in 
the military districts.  Even so, Sergei Mironov argues that the reform pay 
increases are not enough, but that the average salary must be increased by 70 to 
100 percent. (25)  
 
Despite the economic and technological challenges for building up armed forces 
that have been neglected for nearly two decades, perhaps the biggest challenge 
still lies with the senior officers tasked to implement the reform.  A military 
analyst, Aleksandr Golts, hypothesized that key leaders will produce a “new 
military doctrine,” in order to bog down the reforms indefinitely.  As if in support of 
this theory, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev announced that a new 
national security doctrine would be ready in February 2009 and that the main 
working group charged with drafting this doctrine will be chaired by General Yuri 
Baluyevsky (former Chief of the General Staff and a purported opponent to the 
Serdyukov reforms). (26)  It will be necessary, posits Golts, to have a new 
doctrine approved before the reforms can be enacted, and this new doctrine 
likely will suggest that large formations (such as NATO and the United States) 
are the main threats to Russia, deftly making Serdyukov’s reform, particularly 
with regard to force downsizing, out of synch with the newly established doctrine. 
(27)  
 
It seems apparent that due to conflicting opinions regarding the pace of reform, 
extent of the manpower cuts, training center closures, base realignments, and 
the compensation offered to the now unemployed officers, military reform will be 
a challenging task for the Russian Defense Ministry.  And in the chaos of an 
uncertain global economy, issues such as force and equipment modernization 
promise only to add to the difficulties of reform. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Shaun Barnes 
 
Russia-US relations: More than rhetoric? 
If the statements of public officials are any indication, Moscow is not immune to 
the sentiment of “hope” that seems to color perceptions of the new US president, 
Barack Obama.  To a degree, this may reflect positive expectations of a new 
approach toward Moscow on the part of the Obama administration.  But, perhaps 
more importantly, it is a result of the very real structural changes in international 
politics brought about by the current global economic crisis.  Declining Russian 
power for the foreseeable future makes confrontation with the United States an 
unaffordable luxury.  The changing of the guard in Washington thus presents an 
opportunity for Moscow to ease the tensions that followed Russian actions and 
rhetoric in the last year.  
 
Members of Russia’s foreign policy elite have expressed guarded optimism about 
the potential for working with the new administration in Washington.  Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin said Obama appeared to be a “sincere and honest 
person.”  Though he cautioned against “excessive expectations,” Putin 
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maintained, “we totally agree that we have a lot in common in resolving the 
problems of preventing an arms race, problems in the Middle East and Iran and 
non-proliferation problems.” (1)  President Dimitri Medvedev “hopes for a 
partnership and nothing else” from his American counterpart. (2)  The Chairman 
of the Federation Council International Affairs Committee believes that improved 
Russian-US relations will be “driven by necessity” on Washington’s part. (3)  
Diplomatic pleasantries of this nature typify the response to most new heads of 
state, but there is reason to believe that substance may lie behind these 
pronouncements.  
 
First, statements from the new administration offer some signs of an effort to 
entice Russia into a new approach vis-à-vis Washington. Thus, Obama’s foreign 
policy platform places a great deal of emphasis on diplomacy, and he has called 
for “cooperative engagement with the Russian government” as part of his 
agenda. (4)  In her Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton also stressed the need for the US and Russia, “whatever our differences,”  
to “reengage […] on nuclear security.” (5)   
 
However, the other factor that augurs a change of tack in Russia’s US policy is 
the erosion of its international position by the ongoing economic crisis.  Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov’s claim that Russia “accumulated serious foreign policy 
capital” in 2008 may have been true in the middle of last year, but that “capital” 
has been degraded by ruble devaluations, tumbling energy prices, and the 
specter of global recession (as well as Russia’s own actions in the Caucasus.) 
(6)  Consequently, President Medvedev has put overcoming the financial crisis at 
the top his foreign policy agenda. (7)  
 
The scope of the shift is dramatic.  Russia’s currency began to recover only 
recently after losing nearly thirty percent of its value between August and 
January. (8)  Even now, the sustainability of any gains is questionable.  The 
precipitous drop in oil prices from their 2008 high of nearly $147 per barrel has 
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led Prime Minister Putin to order the federal budget re-calibrated assuming an oil 
price of just $41 per barrel, rather the $95 assumed prior to the fall. (9)  Sagging 
petroleum markets also undercut a key component of Russia’s foreign policy – 
the joint development of energy projects abroad.  Russia’s finance minister 
warned that inflation could reach as high as thirteen percent in 2009. (10)  All of 
these problems, in addition to declining foreign exchange reserves and slower 
economic growth, will burden Russia in the coming months. 
 
Facing such economic constraints and the need for a greater focus on domestic 
policy problems, it comes as no surprise that Russia is extending an olive 
branch, however tentatively, to the new leadership in the United States, in an 
effort to win some breathing room until a recovery occurs.  That being said, the 
change of administration in Washington also brings opportunities for Russia, 
even with its diminished power. 
 
America faces its own steep economic hurdles and domestic affairs will almost 
certainly will command the lion’s share of President Obama’s attention in the 
coming months.  In foreign affairs, the drawing down of US troops in Iraq, the 
planned “surge” in Afghanistan, and the Iranian nuclear program, among other 
issues, take precedence over Russia and present openings for Russian 
cooperation with the US, if Moscow is prepared to change its approach. 
 
One example pertains to discussion of a possible deal on the use of a route that 
passes over Russian territory as an alternative to the Khyber Pass for the transit 
of supplies to NATO troops in Afghanistan.  While denying reports that such an 
agreement had been reached, Russia’s NATO envoy did not rule out the 
possibility of a new transit route if the formal consultation mechanism of the 
NATO-Russia Council is restored after its suspension during Russia’s incursion 
into Georgia. (11)  President Medvedev also endorsed this position, stating, “We 
are ready for fully fledged and equal cooperation on security in Afghanistan, 
including with the United States.” (12)  
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The leveraging of Russian cooperation on American foreign policy priorities is a 
pattern that may be repeated over other issues.  Indeed, in the published portion 
of Medvedev’s instructions to his ambassador to the US, a dominant theme is 
cooperation across a range of issues from the economy to terrorism and counter-
proliferation. (13)  It remains to be seen whether Russia can extract any foreign 
policy gains beyond greater stability and more open communications channels in 
this way. 
 
Another test case may present itself as the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START I) nears expiration in December. (14)  The Obama administration has 
made strategic arms reductions a priority and talks on a replacement for START I 
could present an opportunity for Moscow to press its case for an end to the 
European-based component of America’s ballistic missile defense system.  Even 
if missile defense isn’t discussed, a new strategic arms reduction agreement 
would present budgetary and security benefits to Russia that, in and of 
themselves, may warrant working more closely with the US. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
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Market price for gas questioned behind the “Façade of Reasonableness” 
An interesting phrase appeared recently in one of the many articles covering the 
gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine.  Describing the Russian contender, 
author Peter Rutland wrote: “On one side we have the Kremlin, eager to flex its 
geopolitical muscles behind a façade of reasonableness.” (1)  Rutland’s 
comment is significant in that it points to an unexamined premise, namely, that 
market-oriented pricing is reasonable, per se. During the confrontation with Kiev, 
Gazprom officials fortified their position by invoking unassailable principles of 
fiscal responsibility and market-oriented pricing mechanisms. Meanwhile, behind 
the “façade of reasonableness,” Gazprom executives are reevaluating their 
commitment to current marketing arrangements that drag the price of gas down 
with the plummeting price of oil. (2) 
 
What is the fair market value of natural gas? 
The principle of market value was developed by the Dutch as the basis for 
marketing natural gas in the 1960’s.  (3) In order to secure a share of the energy 
market, the price of gas was pegged just below the price of whatever alternative 
fuels potential customers were using at the time. (4) The market value principle 
provided a ceiling that hovered just below the price of alternative fuels, meaning 
that customers would never pay more for gas than for alternative fuels. At the 
same time, the ceiling was also a floor, meaning that consumers would never pay 
much less. 
 
Because the price of gas varies in relation to the price of alternative fuels that it is 
replacing, export prices for gas were set according to the market value of 
whatever fuels happened to dominate the market in the individual customer 
country. The relative market value of gas required specific provisions that would 
allow for periodic readjustments, as the mix of alternative fuels in the customer 
country changed and as the prices for those alternative fuels fluctuated. Thus, 
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gas supply contracts entitled the parties to review price provisions at regular 
intervals, typically occurring every three years. (5) 
 
When Russia began exporting gas to Western Europe in the 1970’s, the 
economic structures of the USSR did not provide an adequate model for 
constructing market-based pricing arrangements. Consequently, the Russian gas 
sector adopted the Dutch pricing template early on. In the last decades, during 
Russia’s transition to a market-based economy, the gas sector largely has 
retained the basic Dutch pricing model, although with several important 
distinctions. The most significant change introduced into Russian supply 
contracts is the unique point of reference from which the market price of gas is 
calculated. Russia’s gas export monopoly Gazprom chose as its starting point 
the price paid in Western European markets at the end of the pipeline. From that 
price, it deducts transportation costs between the intermediate importing country 
and the countries at the end of the pipeline in order to arrive at the gas supply 
contract price in the target country. 
 
That, in theory, is how Gazprom arrived at the price that will be paid by Ukraine 
in 2009. After factoring in a twenty percent discount, the average price Ukraine 
will pay ranges between $230 and $250 per thousand cubic meters. (6) However, 
Gazprom has yet to disclose a clear, objective formula that would allow its 
customers access to a predictable market-oriented price index. 
 
Although analysts agree that the long-term solution to future disputes can be 
found in a system of multi-year contracts with the gas price tied to the global 
price of oil, today’s answers may not continue to play a predominant role in 
European gas imports in the future. (7) The Russian economy has suffered a 
shock in the past year from the falling price of oil, and the prospect of maintaining 
oil as a key calibrator for the price of gas seems dubious at present. With the 
costs of extracting and transporting gas rising steeply, and the price of oil 
plummeting from a high of $147 last July to below $50 today, Russia is looking to 
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alternative pricing schemes. In December, Russia convened a charter meeting of 
the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Moscow to formalize an 
organization that will allow gas exporters to address ways of disconnecting the 
price of gas from that of oil.  Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin used the 
opportunity to announce “the era of cheap energy resources, of cheap gas, is of 
course coming to an end.” (8) 
 
Ministers at the GCEF repudiated the notion that the Forum will develop into an 
OPEC-like producers’ cartel capable of monopolizing global gas supply. 
However, though specific proposals have not been disclosed, the GECF’s 
agenda includes maintaining high global gas rates through production cuts, 
calculating the cost of future investments into the return on the product, keeping 
gas-to-gas competition out of the realm of the possible, and re-calibrating the 
gas-to-oil pricing formula that is proving to be disadvantageous. For Gazprom, 
the need to find a new market-oriented pricing mechanism is particularly urgent 
as the three-year price reviews for its Western European supply contracts 
approach. If the price of gas Gazprom charges Germany, France and Italy is re-
calibrated to reflect the current price of oil, Russia stands to lose its main source 
of hard currency for years to come. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
Media freedom 
Media freedom in Georgia has been a particular concern since November 2007 
when the government closed the Imedi television station in the midst of 
opposition. Imedi had developed into a sensationalistic opposition television 
station and provided a great deal of support to the multiple opposition parties that 
sponsored protests on the fourth anniversary of the parliamentary elections that 
produced the Rose Revolution. The station, which subsequently reopened and 
then closed again, has been in flux since the death of oligarch owner Badri 
Patarkatsishvili last winter. Imedi currently is the source of an ownership dispute 
between Patarkatsishvili’s heirs. 
 
Other television stations include Rustavi 2 and Mze. Both generally support the 
government. The Georgian Industrial Group, belonging to National Movement 
MP David Bezhuashvili, holds a 45 percent share in both companies. (1)  A 
majority stake (55 percent) in both Rustavi 2 and Mze is held by GeoMedia 
Group, a business interest about which very little is known. Kavkasia is an 
 31 
independent television station and sometimes produces controversial pieces, but 
the low production quality of its broadcasts makes it less appealing. 
 
Concerns about the state of Georgia’s media may be exaggerated. President 
Saakashvili recently pointed out that opposition leaders were criticizing the lack 
of free speech and press freedom “while speaking live on the television.” “It is 
ridiculous,” he concluded. (2) 
 
Nonetheless, self-censorship with regard to politically sensitive stories seems to 
be the norm. In part, this is the result of an attitude among journalists that 
suggests that the media should give the politicians brought to power by the Rose 
Revolution the chance to prove themselves before criticizing them too harshly. 
This perspective is particularly noticeable at Rustavi 2, which was influential in 
bringing Saakashvili to power. A former Rustavi 2 journalist paraphrased his 
colleagues to explain the prevalent attitude: “We brought those guys to 
government. We know them very well. We are, in most cases, [the] same 
age.…[G]ive them time.” (3) 
 
Among the greatest weaknesses of Georgian media are low levels of 
professionalism and the influence of owners (and the politicians with whom they 
have relationships) on media content. Much of the “news” that is reported in the 
Georgian media is based on rumor or is inadequately sourced. Tinatin Dvilashvili 
is a journalist and Media Project Manager at the Georgian Foundation for 
Strategic and International Studies, an influential Tbilisi think tank. Dvilashvili 
attributes the sub par performance of professional journalists to low salaries and 
the lack of adequate training. (4) In the Shevardnadze era, media training was 
available primarily through Western-funded NGOs such as Internews. Following 
the Rose Revolution, the perception of Georgia as an accomplished democracy 
led to a decline in civil society assistance and democracy building aid. One 
impact of the shift in aid streams has been a decline in the availability of media 
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training for young journalists, although several formal educational programs offer 
journalist training. 
 
Sozar Subari, Georgia’s ombudsman, presented a report to parliament in 
December that strongly criticized the current state of Georgian media. He 
accused the government of controlling media content by exerting pressure on 
owners of media outlets. (5) In his turn, the ombudsman has come in for criticism 
from authorities. In a recent television appearance, Saakashvili alleged that the 
Public Defender’s office has become politicized and that Subari is using his 
position as preparation for entering politics. (6) Subari has become increasingly 
outspoken since the protests that resulted in the closure of the Imedi television 
station. 
 
Russian naval base in Abkhazia? 
The Russian General Staff has announced that the Russian navy has agreed “in 
principle” to establish a naval base on Abkhazia’s Black Sea coastline in the town 
of Ochamchire. (7) If confirmed, these reports will represent a further 
consolidation of Russia’s position within Georgian sovereign territory. 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
March referendum to abolish presidential term limits 
On 18 March, Azerbaijan will hold a referendum about whether or not to amend 
the section of the constitution that limits the president to two five-year-terms. 
Current President Ilham Aliyev’s second term expires in 2013. The decision to 
hold the referendum was approved by parliament, in a vote of 100-7. (8) 
Opposition politicians, among them Panah Huseyn from the Musavat party, 
criticized the proposed amendment as being illustrative of Azerbaijan’s lack of 
democratic progress. (9) A group of opposition parties has come together to 
oppose the changes. (10) Members of this group have complained of pressure 
from authorities, including the detention of multiple individuals while collecting the 
signatures needed for registration. (11) 
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In an interesting example of the power of the press, a group of pro-government 
journalists has come forward to support the abolition of presidential term limits. 
(12) Not surprisingly, the group is led by the editors of two pro-government 
newspapers. 
 
Government bans foreign radio 
As of 1 January, Azerbaijan has banned the broadcast of international radio on 
national frequencies. The ban included broadcasters such as Radio Liberty, the 
Voice of America, the BBC and Europa Plus, a Russian radio station. The 
government cites the need to bring its regulations into line with the Council of 
Europe as the reason for the new policy. (13) The ban does not affect the Turkish 
national station, which has a special deal under which it can broadcast in 
Azerbaijan in exchange for the Azeri national radio station being aired in Turkey. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Rustavi 2 TV Head Tight-Lipped on Ownership Issue,” Civil Georgia, 2 Mar 
08 via 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=17243&search=Rustavi%202%20TV%20H
ead%20Tight-Lipped%20on%20Ownership%20Issue. 
(2) “Saakashvili on Freedom of Media,” Civil Georgia, 23 Jan 09 via 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=20313. 
(3) Author interview, 1 May 08. 
(4) Author interview, 5 May 08.  
(5) “Public Defender Presents Report on Media,” Civil Georgia, 14 Nov 08 via 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=19964&search=media. 
(6) “Public Defender’s Office Politicized in Georgia, President of Georgia,” 
media.ge, 26 Jan 09 via 
http://media.ge/eng/page.php?m=news_detailed&id_numb=3838. 
(7) “Russia to set up naval base in breakaway Georgian region in 2009 - General 
Staff,” ITAR-TASS, 26 Jan 09; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(8) “Nationwide Poll on Presidential Terms Due March 18,” AssA-Irada, 26 Dec 
08 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(9) “Nationwide Poll on Presidential Terms Due March 18,” AssA-Irada, 26 Dec 
08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(10) “Azeri opposition sets up movement against constitutional changes,” 
Azerbaijani news agency APA, 9 Jan 09, BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(11)” Azeri opposition activists detained over anti-referendum campaign – 
agency,” Turan, 23 Jan 09; BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(12) “Azeri pro-government reporters set up group to advocate constitutional 
changes,” Yeni Azarbaycan, 14 Jan 09; BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) “Azerbaijan bans foreign radio broadcasts on local frequencies,” Interfax, 30 
Dec 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Kyrgyz president attempting to milk two cows at once? 
On February 3, following weeks of conjecture and speculation by politicians and 
media pundits, Kyrgyzstan’s President Kurmanbek Bakiev finally announced that 
his government does intend to request the closure of the US air base at the 
Manas airport (located just outside Bishkek).  Bakiev issued his announcement in 
Moscow, immediately after receiving assurances from the Russian government 
that his country would be granted a US$2 billion loan, as well as US$150 million 
in other aid.  However, Bakiev’s Feb. 3 statement does not appear to constitute 
an official request for the closure of the base; the precise words of his 
announcement, as quoted in ITAR-TASS, were that his government “has made 
the decision on ending the term for the American base on the territory of 
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Kyrgyzstan and in the near future, this decision will be announced,” (1) leaving 
the timeline for the base closure wide open and thus also leaving the door open 
for further negotiations with the US. 
 
Bakiev informed the media that his decision to end American use of the base 
was based on growing domestic opposition to the presence of US forces on 
Kyrgyz soil, as well as on the US government’s ostensible unwillingness to 
discuss increasing the financial benefits it provides to his country, in return for 
leasing the base: “…American partners and us [sic] have many times discussed 
an economic compensation to Kyrgyzstan, but no understanding has been 
reached. Kyrgyzstan has been asking the United States to review the relationship 
for more than three years but to no avail.” (2)  The Kyrgyz president seems to 
have forgotten that in July 2006 the US agreed to a considerable increase in both 
rent payments and other “compensation” in return for a renewal of the Manas 
lease.  The 2006 lease renewal garnered the Kyrgyz government a total of 
US$150 million in economic benefits, including US$63 million for the use of the 
base and to pay for supply contracts and wages of the local personnel who work 
on the base.  The president also appears to have missed widely reported 
statements on the matter made by General David Petraeus, head of the US 
Central Command (CENTCOM), during his visit to Bishkek last month.  Gen. 
Petraeus emphasized the importance of the Manas air base in supporting US 
military operations in Afghanistan and mentioned the possibility of further raises 
in rent payments. (3)  In fact, the general stated quite unequivocally that the US 
wishes to increase the compensation that Kyrgyzstan receives for leasing the 
base and that a delegation from the US would be traveling to Bishkek soon to 
discuss the matter: “I noted our desire to increase the benefits that accrue to your 
country from Manas and the other activities, and we'll be sending a team of 
senior officers here in February to discuss in concrete ways various programs 
that we can undertake.” (4) 
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President Bakiev’s advisers and staff are being more than a little remiss if they 
neglect to keep him informed of significant developments in Kyrgyz-US relations, 
particularly when those developments augur substantial financial benefits for his 
own administration.  Of course, it is possible that the President merely feigned 
ignorance of the latest events in order not to antagonize his other benefactor, 
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev.  The Kyrgyz government is in desperate 
need of any and all types of financial aid, be it in the form of loans, investments, 
debt forgiveness and/or grants.  Kyrgyzstan has been battling energy shortages 
since winter 2008 and even Bishkek’s residents have been forced to endure 
power blackouts since last spring.  President Bakiev is doing his best to lay the 
blame anywhere but on his own administration, to little avail – the public’s 
dissatisfaction with a government unable to meet some of the country’s most 
basic needs will not be appeased by politicians’ finger-pointing and blame-
shifting. 
 
The Russian government, despite its own current financial shortcomings, has 
promised to help prop up Bakiev’s administration by investing US$1.7 billion in 
Kyrgyzstan’s aging and rapidly decaying energy infrastructure, specifically in the 
hydropower industry, as well as writing off a chunk of Kyrgyzstan’s debt (US$180 
million) and injecting US$150 million directly into the Kyrgyz state budget.  The 
$1.7 billion is an interest-free loan to be used for the completion of the 
Kambarata-1 hydropower project.  The project is due to be competed in four 
years. (5)  Unfortunately, even if the new hydropower station is finished ahead of 
schedule, it will do nothing to help Bakiev lead his country through the upcoming 
months.  Spring 2009 is likely to be a critical period not only for the survival of 
Bakiev’s administration, but for the survival of neighboring regimes, as well.  
Central Asia is facing a significant water shortage, due to both Kyrgyzstan’s and 
Tajikistan’s overuse of water from their reservoirs, water that is used to produce 
hydroelectric power domestically, but which is also needed for irrigation in 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.  No amount of Russian financial aid can change the 
current situation; in fact, if the Kambarata-1 station indeed is ready to go on-line 
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four years from now, there may be insufficient water to power it, which eventually 
may cause Moscow to reconsider its generosity. 
 
There is also the question of whether or not Bakiev’s presidency will be able to 
survive the widespread social unrest which may well ensue as a consequence of 
continued power outages, the still rising cost of living (which will include ever 
greater hikes in electricity rates), and the not inconsiderable outrage of 
neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, when their spring crops go unwatered.  
The Kazakh government may balk at the use of armed force to secure the water 
resources it needs, but Uzbekistan’s President Karimov does not seem to suffer 
a similar inhibition.  Civil conflict in Kyrgyzstan and/or armed conflict between two 
or more Central Asian states over water resources also could give the Russian 
government pause at the prospect of becoming anymore involved in 
Kyrgyzstan’s affairs. 
 
The timing of Bakiev’s announcement regarding the base closure comes at an 
interesting time – not only has Russia promised an unprecedented amount of 
investment into a Central Asian state facing numerous and perhaps 
insurmountable socioeconomic challenges, but Moscow also has given the green 
light to the establishment of new NATO supply routes to Afghanistan across its 
own territory and that of the Central Asian states.  The significance of the Manas 
air base would seem to loom rather large in this scenario and Bakiev’s threat to 
request its closure, along with the Putin-Medvedev diarchy’s reported support for 
this move is an odd juxtaposition to Moscow’s purported desire for greater 
cooperation with NATO in its military operations in Afghanistan, operations that 
the US air base at Manas buttresses.  This raises the possibility that the primary 
purpose of Bakiev’s announcement and Moscow’s continued grumbling over the 
US presence in Kyrgyzstan is to put additional pressure both on Washington and 
NATO, in order to extract the maximum economic benefit from whatever new 
agreements might ensue. 
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In any case, Bakiev himself can not make the decision on whether to evict US 
troops from Kyrgyzstan or not, he may only issue a recommendation on the 
matter to parliament, which must then draft and pass relevant legislation, 
including a deadline for the base’s evacuation.  Neither of the signatories to the 
lease agreement has the right to terminate it unilaterally and the whole process 
likely would take at least six months, (12) providing plenty of time for further 
negotiations between Bishkek, the US, and NATO. 
 
However, if the water and energy crises facing Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors 
prove to be too much of a challenge for President Bakiev and he loses his grip on 
power amid renewed social unrest, both the US and NATO may feel compelled 
to rethink their use of the Manas base.  The Kyrgyz president appears to be 
gambling with heavy stakes, while holding a hand that grows ever weaker – 
hopefully his bravado will not cost his country’s citizens everything they have. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) Mike Eckel, “Kyrgyzstan closing US base key to Afghan conflict,” 3 Feb 09, 
Associated Press via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) “US hopes for further use of Manas base in Kyrgyzstan,” 3 Feb 09, ITAR-
TASS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) “Issue of U.S. airbase in Kyrgyzstan to be solved by early Feb - MP (Part 2),” 
22 Jan 09, Central Asia General Newswire; Interfax via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) “Remarks To The Press By General David H. Petraeus Commander, 
USCENTCOM,” Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 19 Jan 08, Embassy of the United States, 
Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, “Latest Headlines” via 
<http://bishkek.usembassy.gov/uploads/images/48nJ-
eocXBLOYmaYSbkzNA/Gen_Petraeus_Eng.pdf>, accessed on 5 Feb 09. 
(5) John C.K. Daly, “Analysis: Manas, energy and the U.S.,” 4 Feb 09, U.P.I via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) “Kyrgyzstan denies plans to end U.S. base lease,” 12 Jan 09, RIA Novosti via 
Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Ukraine’s gas deal:  What’s it all about?  
The recent Russia-Ukraine gas crisis generally was understood in Western 
circles as a disagreement over both gas price and Ukraine’s foreign policy 
choices.  But the underpinnings of the crisis actually were much more 
complicated.  These underpinnings included Russia’s apparent desire to control 
Ukraine’s pipeline system, the questionable function of corporate gas brokers, 
and the identification of a fair gas price based on real figures.  The battle also 
involved Russia’s determination not to work with Ukraine’s president, as well as 
Russia’s desire to create a case for funding proposed pipelines that bypass 
Ukraine.  With so much at stake, it’s no wonder that both sides stood on forceful 
and inflexible positions at one point.  
 
In the end, the gas deal appears to have made both sides unhappy in some 
respects – a sure sign that a genuine compromise was struck. 
 
The details of the deal are complicated, but largely transparent.  Ukraine will pay 
a “European price” for gas received from Russia. (1) That price will be refigured 
each quarter, based on market fluctuations.  Because the global “market” gas 
price is tied to oil with a seven to nine month lag, Russia and Ukraine both can 
estimate the “market” gas price already through at least August, and possibly 
October.  This allows the countries to determine, based on the volume of gas 
purchased, that Ukraine will pay an average of $228 per 1000 cubic meters (tcm) 
of gas in 2009.  (2) 
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Although the $228 figure is higher than the approximately $180 Ukraine paid in 
2008, it is far below the $450 Russia demanded during the height of the gas 
conflict.  It is also below the “final offer” of $250 made by Russia on 31 December 
– one day before the gas to Ukraine was turned off.  In this respect, it is a clear 
win for Ukraine.    
 
Russia has attempted to represent this figure as a “special” price that includes a 
20% discount granted to its “partner” – for which Ukrainians, of course, should be 
grateful. (3)  Indeed, when signing the deal, Ukraine Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko went out of her way to sound appreciative.  “I am very grateful to 
Vladimir Vladimirovich [Putin] and his team,” she said, “for their readiness to 
provide special conditions for Ukraine in 2009.”  (4)   Tymoshenko’s 
overwhelming (but somewhat forced) gratitude led a Moscow-based reporter to 
remark admiringly on the Prime Minister’s “feminine cunning.”  (5)  
 
It is far from clear, however, whether the $228 price truly is a sharply discounted 
price, given the decline in oil prices during 2008.  As suggested in this issue by 
Creelea Henderson (See Energy Report), Gazprom’s formula to determine a 
“market” price is far from transparent.  In fact, as Ukraine pointed out repeatedly 
during the gas crisis, Gazprom’s market price is open to interpretation depending 
on which country is involved, and it seems often to be set arbitrarily.    
 
Following her agreement with Putin, Tymoshenko publicized the prices she said 
were to be paid by several other countries.  She said Moldova, for example, will 
pay $280/tcm in 2009, while Belarus will pay under $200/tcm and Poland will pay 
$389/tcm. (6)  Belarus has confirmed that it will pay a price that is close to the 
figure quoted by Tymoshenko, while Moldova has said it paid $280 in 2008, but 
could pay less this year.  
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However, Moldova’s President Vladimir Voronin recently announced that during 
the first quarter of 2009 his country will pay $318/tcm, as opposed to Ukraine’s 
“discounted price” of $360/tcm for the same period.  (7) 
 
This suggests that either Ukraine is not really receiving a discount, or that 
Moldova is receiving a much greater discount.  The latter is very possible, given 
that Moldova has ceded partial control of its gas transit pipeline system to 
Gazprom and has received a concession that allows a very gradual move to 
“European prices” by 2012.   Belarus has received a similar agreement.  
 
These deals undermine the idea of a market-based “average European price” 
while placing control of pipelines in the hands of Gazprom.  Although such an 
arrangement repeatedly has been suggested for Ukraine by Gazprom, the idea is 
strongly opposed by the majority of Ukraine’s voters.  With the presidential 
election less than one year away, politicians suggesting consideration of 
Gazprom’s offered arrangement do so at their own risk.  
 
Gazprom’s average European price also appears to be undermined by the 
current Russia-Germany agreement.   According to numerous sources familiar 
with the deal, Germany will pay an average price of $280/tcm in 2009 – even 
though the cost to transport gas to Germany would be higher than that to Poland, 
which is paying much more. (8) 
 
According to Ukraine’s Naftohaz gas corporation, Ukraine will pay $270/tcm 
during the second quarter of the year, $219/tcm during the third and $162/tcm 
during the fourth, as gas prices gradually catch up to oil prices. (9) Gazprom did 
not refute any of these figures. 
 
Ukraine appears to be the first Gazprom client to release specific pricing, volume, 
and formula details of its contract; the Russian company generally insists on 
confidentiality.  This secretiveness allows Gazprom to suggest prices without 
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providing comparative data, as it did throughout its gas spat with Ukraine.  For 
example, although Gazprom suggested that “Europe” would pay $450/tcm during 
the first quarter of 2009, it is clear now that few, if any, countries actually will pay 
this price.  Journalists were unable to confirm or refute this figure at the time 
(assuming they tried), since pricing details of Gazprom clients were confidential. 
 
Moreover, the Ukrainian price of $360/tcm for the first quarter primarily seems to 
be for Russia’s public relations benefit, since Ukraine will buy almost none of its 
gas at that price.  In fact, shortly after the deal was signed, Gazprom confirmed 
that it had sold Ukraine all of the gas held in storage by the gas intermediary 
RosUkrEnergo (RUE, 50% owned by Gazprom) at a price of $167/tcm. (10)  This 
deal—agreed upon separately and announced quietly days after the main gas 
agreements were signed—is a major reason why Ukraine’s price will average 
below other countries in Europe (with the notable exception of Russia’s close ally 
Belarus).   
 
After the agreement was signed, Tymoshenko also announced that the so-called 
“technical” gas used to operate pumping stations sending gas to Europe will be 
purchased at a fixed annual rate of between $153 and $167/tcm. (11) Since 
Ukraine can use up to 18 million cubic meters of technical gas per day, this price 
amounts to a huge savings.  In fact, it is less than the price paid for technical gas 
last year ($179/tcm). 
 
Finally, Ukraine will carefully control its gas purchasing.  The country holds about 
15 billion cubic meters of gas in its own storage and will take possession of 11 
billion from RUE.  Therefore, Ukraine will need only a few million cubic meters of 
gas before April, when the plummeting oil prices begin pushing down gas prices.  
“We will limit the purchase of gas in the first quarter,” Tymoshenko explained, 
since “there is simply no need to consume expensive gas during this time.  That 
is why we have storage facilities and why we pumped gas into them all year.  
And now we have the necessary leeway … .” (12) 
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Moreover, the country will purchase between 10 and 15 million fewer cubic 
meters of gas than last year.  This decrease in gas needs is an ironically positive 
effect of the global economic crisis, as plummeting metallurgical production leads 
to a drastic decrease in gas required to run Ukraine’s factories.    
 
In the agreement, Tymoshenko achieved her long-desired goal of removing the 
RUE gas intermediary.   RUE’s removal also had been encouraged by, among 
others, the EU and several independent monitoring groups.  In particular, 
international corruption monitor Global Witness, after years of investigating, 
suggested that RUE’s structure and opaque nature created a clear impression of 
corruption.  (13) 
 
In a comment released during the gas crisis, Global Witness noted that RUE 
earned profits of approximately $800 million per year.  However, “RosUkrEnergo 
has sat astride one of the most strategic and lucrative energy supply routes into 
the EU while revealing very little about its activities or, for nearly two years, even 
naming all its shareholders.”  
(14) 
 
Despite this achievement, Ukraine failed to achieve one basic goal during its 
negotiations; although it will pay more for its gas, the country will not receive an 
increase in the fees Russia pays for the right to transit gas through Ukraine.   
Therefore, there will be no offset of the additional cost Ukraine will pay for its gas 
in 2009.  This additional cost for Ukraine is expected to equal between two and 
three billion dollars.  
 
There is no way to know, of course, what political side agreements may or may 
not have been made during the talks between Putin and Tymoshenko.  Will 
Russia tacitly support Tymoshenko’s bid against Yushchenko for the presidency 
later this year?  Did Tymoshenko agree to drastically alter Ukraine’s strategies to 
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join NATO or integrate with the EU? Will Gazprom be provided expanded access 
to Ukraine’s domestic gas network? Did Tymoshenko agree to discuss an 
extension of the Black Sea Fleet lease?  Or did she agree to allow gas 
exploration on the Black Sea Shelf? 
 
The answers to all of these questions are important and will remain unknown in 
the near to medium-term future.  It is clear, though, that Yushchenko was 
effectively frozen-out of negotiations by Putin.  The Russian president’s pre-
existing animosity toward his Ukrainian counterpart increased following 
Yushchenko’s defense of Georgia’s position during the August 2008 Russia-
Georgia conflict.   For his part, Yushchenko showed no desire to negotiate with 
Russia over any part of the gas deal.  
 
Still, following the agreement, Yushchenko attacked his prime minister and likely 
presidential election competitor, suggesting she had betrayed Ukraine’s national 
interests.  He then instituted a criminal investigation of Tymoshenko’s actions.  
(15) 
 
Tymoshenko responded simply.  “I believe if the president could have secured 
better conditions,” she said, “there was no one to stop him.”  (16)  
 
The next gas price adjustment negotiation with Russia will occur during the 
upcoming presidential campaign, with an election to take place between 26 
December 2009 and 23 January 2010.  The path of negotiations, and the ease or 
difficulty with which an agreement is reached, very well could depend on the type 
of role Russia would like to play in Ukraine at that time.  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Statement by Prime Ministers Vladimir Putin and Yulia Tymoshenko, 17 Jan 
08 via Russia Today news channel at 
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wYdeVQDvojc (English) and Vesti at 
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(7) Infotag News Agency (Moldova), 27 Jan 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(13) “It's a Gas. Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade,” Global 
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